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Abstract 
Colonial discourse would provide the European imperialistic expansion with the 
ideological and moral legitimation through the myth of the civilizing mission. In 
order to allow the European conqueror to take possession of lands, it was first 
necessary to construe them as “blank spaces” and erase the signs inscribed on 
them by the peoples inhabiting them. What I intend to do here is precisely to 
analyze how the signs of the Other were erased in a quite peculiar form of 
colonialism: Zionism. 
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Resumo 
O discurso colonial daria à Europa legitimação ideológica e moral para a 
expansão imperialista através do mito de uma missão civilizatória. Para permitir 
que o conquistador tomasse posse das terras era necessário, antes, que elas 
fossem entendidas como “espaços em branco” e apagar os sinais inscritos 
nelas deixados pelos habitantes. O que pretendo fazer aqui é precisamente 
analisar como os sinais do Outro foram apagados numa forma particular de 
colonialismo: Sinosmo. 
Palavras-chaves: Sionismo; colonialismo; discurso 
 
 
 
  
L'oubli, et je dirai même l'erreur 
historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la 
création d'une nation. 
Ernest Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” 
 
 
In a famous passage of Conrad's Heart of Darkness, the protagonist 
Charlie Marlow recalls his early childhood passion for maps, tracing back to it 
his vocation for travels: 
At that time there were many blank spaces on the earth, and when I saw 
one that looked particularly inviting on a map (but they all looked like that) I 
would put my finger on it and say, When I grow up I will go there (Conrad, 1998: 
142).  
This image really proves to be paradigmatic, as not only does it account for 
the ambiguity of exploration enterprises which were inevitably due to end up in 
conquests, but it pictures iconically the way the colonial discourse forms. 
Colonial discourse would provide the European imperialistic expansion with the 
ideological and moral legitimation through the myth of the civilizing mission, a 
myth all the more necessary inasmuch as, in Marlow’s words again, “the 
conquest of the earth [...] is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. 
What redeems is the idea only” (Conrad, 1998: 141-2). In the aforesaid passage 
it is clearly showed how, in order to allow the European conqueror to take 
possession of those lands and “make them exist” through an act of “baptism” 
(Calefato, 2006: 14), it was first necessary to construe them as “blank spaces” 
and erase the signs inscribed on them by the peoples inhabiting them. What I 
intend to do here is precisely to analyze how the signs of the Other were erased 
in a quite peculiar form of colonialism: Zionism. 
That Zionism is a form of colonialism has always been maintained by its 
main victims, the Palestinians, by most of the Arabs and communists, and by 
isolated Western voices such as David Hirst and Maxime Rodinson. For the 
past twenty years, though, this assertion has been confirmed by a diverse and 
varied wave of young Israeli scholars, widely known as “new historians” 
(Shlaim, 1995). Despite that, even now the hegemonic discourse among 
Western intellectuals and the West’s public opinion refuses – sometimes rabidly 
  
– to equate Zionism with colonialism. An exemplary epitome of this hegemonic 
discourse and of the grand narrative which constitutes the Zionist mythology is 
Jacob Tsur’s L’épopée du sionisme (indeed the title itself belies the author’s 
mythopoetic intentions). Tsur states that not only Zionism is “the Jewish 
people’s movement of national liberation” and that “it constitutes an integral part 
of the wider historic process of the emancipation of the nations” (Tsur, 1977: 9), 
but even that “theirs was one of the first rebellions staged against Western 
imperialism” while “the Arab countries […] had yet to shake off their colonial 
status” (Tsur, 1977: 14). 
Unfortunately for the apologists of Israel, however, Zionism’s colonialist 
character has stood out ever since its inception in world history. The “back to 
Zion” idea indeed was primarily conceived not in Eastern Europe’s Jewish 
communities, but in the chancelleries and literary circles of Europe’s Great 
Powers. Napoléon Bonaparte was the first to propose, during his Egyptian 
Campaign, to settle Jews in Palestine (Weinstock, 1970: 39), a project which 
would later be revived by the poet Alphonse Lamartine and by Ernest 
Laharanne, Napoleon III’s personal assistant. In the mid-nineteenth century the 
“back to Zion” idea gained some following also in Britain, where its main 
proponents were George Eliot and some leading politicians such as Henry 
Palmerston, Benjamin Disraeli and most of all Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of 
Shaftesbury (1801-85), who in 1854 invented the famous slogan “A people 
without a land for a land without a people”. 
In Eastern Europe’s Jewish communities the foundations of Jewish 
nationalism were laid by two rabbis, Yehuda Alkalai from Bosnia (1798-1878) 
and Zvi Hirsch Kalischer from Lithuania (1795-1874). Inspired by the national 
revival of the Balkan peoples, Alkalai and Kalischer conceived the idea – which 
by then sounded quite weird to most of the Jews – that Jewry was a nation, and 
that in order to anticipate the Messiah’s coming they had to buy land in 
Palestine and settle there en masse. However, an accomplished elaboration of 
Jewish nationalism had to wait until the 1860s, when the German journalist 
Moses Hess (1812-1875) wrote the pamphlets Rome and Jerusalem: the last 
national question and A Colonization Project for the Holy Land. In Hess’s 
opinion, anti-Jewish hate would prevent the assimilation of Jews by European 
societies, thus the “Jewish question” had to be faced as an unsolved national 
  
question, whose only solution would be the establishment of a Jewish State in 
the Middle East. Such a state – he argued – would prove useful to the 
European powers, favouring their interests and helping to spread “civilization” in 
the “barbarous” East. Thus, already in these first theorists’ thinking, the Jewish 
“national revival” was considered viable only through a form of colonization 
overseas which was conceived as part and parcel of Europe’s imperial 
expansion. 
The ideas exposed by these early Zionists remained however without 
consequence, until the pressure of Russian antisemitism gave them new life: 
when in 1881 the czar Alexander II was killed by a group of conjurors, rumours 
spread that Russian Jews were responsible, fuelling a whole series of bloody 
pogroms that plagued many Jewish communities of the Czarist Empire and 
ended up in atrocious massacres. Not only did the czarist authorities abstain 
from preventing this bloodshed, they even encouraged the mob to turn on Jews, 
using them as scapegoats for the appalling living conditions of Russian masses. 
Subsequently Russian Jews, who already suffered from hard restrictions of 
movement, were stricken by another turn of the screw of repression. Deeply 
shaken by these tragic events, the Russian surgeon Leib Pinsker wrote in 1882 
the pamphlet Self-emancipation: a warning to his folk by a Russian Jew, 
wherein he invited his coreligionists to colonize a “Promised Land” (Argentina or 
Palestine) and rebuild their nation there. If most of the Russian Jews preferred 
to emigrate to America or to the British dominions, that same year some 
hundreds of Ukrainian Jews (so-called “practical Zionists”) took seriously 
Pinsker’s warning and moved to Palestine, where they bought some land and 
established the first Zionist settlements. 
Zionism would have probably remained a minority movement of no 
consequence had it not been for the Austrian journalist Theodor Herzl. Herzl 
wrote in 1896 the pamphlet Der Judenstaat, where he appropriated the idea 
that Jews were a nation and proposed as a solution to the problem of 
antisemitism that all Israelites moved to an overseas territory and established 
there a State of the Jews. From a theoretical point of view Herzl simply 
repeated Hess’ ideas: the novelty of his contribution was rather that he 
elaborated a detailed political strategy to implement his project, a strategy 
based on the realpolitik of his time, the epoch of nationalisms and of Europe’s 
  
colonial expansion. Herzl saw his project as part and parcel of the latter, and he 
thought that the European powers would have all the best reasons to favour the 
establishment of such a State in the Middle East: “We should there form a 
portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as 
opposed to barbarism” (Herzl, 1936: 30).  
Colonization would have been run by a “Jewish Company […] modelled on 
the lines of a great land-acquisition company” (Herzl, 1936: 33). The first 
settlers to be sent there would be members of the lower classes, as the 
“poorest strata alone form the strongest human material for acquiring a land” 
(Herzl, 1936: 57), and the masses would be mobilized by the myth of the “return 
to Zion”: as Herzl wrote in his diary on June 2, 1895: “If my conception is not 
translated into reality, at least out of my activity can come a novel. Title: the 
promised land” (Herzl, 1960, vol. I: 3). In 1897 Herzl gathered in Basle the first 
Zionist Congress, which founded the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and 
took as its aim the establishment of a Jewish settlement in Palestine. In order to 
obtain from the Ottoman sultan the necessary concessions, Herzl began 
lobbying the European governments to get their support for his project. 
In those years, Zionism appropriated Lord Shaftesbury’s slogan “a people 
without a land for a land without a people”. Reality, however, was quite different: 
Palestine at the time was inhabited by more than half a million Arabs (mostly 
Sunni Muslims, but there were also Christian, Jewish and Druze minorities), 4/5 
of whom were peasants living in small villages. After 1858, when an Ottoman 
reform had introduced private property of land, capitalistic relations of 
production had gradually taken over the ancient semifeudal regime of 
production, turning many tenant fellahin into hired labourers. Towards the end 
of the XIX century the opening up to foreign markets had brought about an 
exponential growth of trade, so that in a short span of time subsistence 
agriculture gave way to export-oriented production, and the increase of demand 
in turn fuelled the agricultural production and the expansion of cultivated land.  
Thus, besides developing as a major crossroads for the trade of raw 
materials coming from Asia, Palestine became a crop supplier for Europe 
(Britain being the main buyer). Far from being “a thinly populated province of 
the Ottoman Empire, sadly neglected and backward” (Tsur, 1977: 31) where 
“entire regions were under the virtual control of nomads and bandits” (Tsur, 
  
1977: 44), as Tsur depicted it drawing on the traditional orientalist stereotypes, 
Palestine was a country in full economic flourishing, where a commercial and 
agrarian bourgeoisie was developing. In the Arab regions of the Ottoman 
Empire those developments were at the origin of nahdah, the Arab cultural and 
political renaissance that gave birth also to the early rising of Arab nationalism 
(Pappé, 2004: 14-49; Hourani, 2005: 299-310; Avino, 2002). 
Herzl actually did not ignore at all that Palestine was inhabited by Arabs: 
quite simply, he considered them irrelevant, in the same way as European 
conquerors in Africa saw that continent as made up of “blank spaces”; thus, in 
order to write the epic of the Jews’ return to the Promised Land, it was first 
necessary to erase the Palestinian Arabs, to ignore deliberately the material 
reality of their presence, so that that land which had been presented as empty 
could really become so. In his personal diaries Herzl explicitly wrote (on June 
12, 1895) that Zionism could not succeed without the dispossession and the 
expulsion of the local population: they had to “expropriate gently […] spirit the 
penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the 
transit country, while denying it any employment in our country [...] discreetly 
and circumspectly” (Herzl, 1960, vol. I: 88).  
Many among the early Zionist settlers did indeed arrive in Palestine with the 
conviction of it being an empty land (Morris, 2001: 42-3): for many of them, the 
discovery that the truth was rather different had a shocking effect. Soon some 
Zionist leaders from the so-called “culturalist” current sharply criticized this 
attitude, and it was not by chance that it was this current that took such a 
stance, as they were the only Zionists who aimed not at establishing a State but 
rather at the revival of a “cultural homeland” for Jews. The Russian writer 
Ascher Ginzburg (aka Ahad Ha’am) debunked the orientalist image of Palestine 
propagated by the likes of Herzl: “We abroad are used to believing that Erez 
Yisrael is now almost totally desolate, a desert that is not sowed [...] But in truth 
that is not the case. Throughout the country it is difficult to find fields that are not 
sowed. Only sandy dunes and stony mountains are not cultivated” (quoted in 
Morris, 2001: 42). 
But Ginzburg’s warnings to abandon the project of a Jewish State could not 
be accepted by the WZO: if Zionism had done so, it would have had to disclaim 
its own premises, as it rested – in Said’s words – on the erasing of a concrete 
  
reality in favour of a future aspiration (Said, 1992: 9). Such being the premises, 
ever since the beginning the relations between the early Zionist settlers and the 
local population took the form of a power relation between colonizers and 
colonized. The famous Martinican political writer and activist Frantz Fanon, one 
of the most distinguished critics of colonialism, explained in his Les Damnés de 
la terre, that the colonial world is “un monde manichéiste” in which “le colon fait 
du colonisé une quintessence du mal” (Fanon, 1976: 10), and indeed in the 
diaries and letters of the early settlers (and indeed also in those of British 
Mandate colonial officials, see Said, 1992: 79-82) Arabs are described as “a 
people in the process of degeneration” (quoted in Morris, 2001: 43), a 
“hypocritical and false race” (ibidem), a “semi-savage people, which has 
extremely primitive concepts” (ibidem). Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, the “father” of 
modern Hebrew, wrote that after his first encounter with Palestinian Arabs he 
had been caught by “a depressing feeling of horror” (quoted in Morris, 2001: 
44).  
“Parfois – Fanon continued – ce manichéisme va jusqu’au bout de sa 
logique et déshumanise le colonisé. A proprement parler, il l’animalise. Et, de 
fait, le langage du colon quand il parle du colonisé, est un langage zoologique” 
(Fanon, 1976: 11): in the first Zionist settlements indeed the colons used to call 
Arab hired labourers “mules” (Morris, 2001: 48), and Ascher Ginzburg remarked 
how the settlers’ attitude towards the tenants was “exactly the same as towards 
their animals” (quoted in Morris, 2001: 48). The orientalist prejudice was 
mirrored also by their representations of the country: Herzl described Jerusalem 
as a heap of “musty deposits of two thousand years of inhumanity, intolerance 
and uncleanliness” (Herzl, 1960, vol. II: 745, my emphasis), and Chaim 
Weizmann, who succeeded him as leader of the WZO, depicted the country as 
“one of the most neglected corners of the miserably neglected Turkish Empire” 
(quoted in Said, 1992: 85).    
As Said remarked (2003: 307) in the Zionist version of Orientalism there 
takes place a bifurcation of the myth of a consistent, static «Orient»: European 
Jews, once considered as part of that same «Orient», now construed 
themselves as assimilated to the «West», assuming its position of dominant 
epistemological subject and leaving to the Arabs the role of «Orientals», 
incapable of development and passive object of knowledge and dominance. 
  
Construing the Arabs as uncivilized barbarians and Palestine as a desert 
waiting for redemption allowed Zionist settlers to perceive themselves as the 
redeemers of the Land of Israel and the representatives of a superior civilization 
fully engaged in a civilizing mission: as one of them put it, “we are the most 
civilized people in Palestine, no one can compete with us from the cultural point 
of view. Most of the natives are but fellahin who ignore everything of Western 
culture” (quoted in Gresh, 2004: 43, my translation), and it is revealing that Tsur 
proudly claims this assumption in his book, maintaining that the Zionist settlers 
“bringing with them experience and knowledge acquired during their long 
generations of exile in Europe, dreamed of making these benefits accessible to 
their neighbours” (Tsur, 1977: 86). In this perspective, as Rabbi David J. 
Goldberg remarks, “the white man’s colonial burden and the Jewish mission 
coincide: they are joint bearers of enlightened progress for the less fortunate” 
(Goldberg, 1996: 78).  
An analysis of the material bases of colonization also confirms the 
colonialist character of the Zionist settlement. Gershon Shafir, who has studied 
its evolution adapting the interpretive models worked out by D. K. Fieldhouse 
and G. Fredrickson (Shafir, 1996; Ram, 1993), has shown how the peculiar 
features of Zionism were simply the result of the particular conditions of its 
development, and that there were no qualitative differences in comparison with 
other forms of colonialism. This evolution developed in three different stages. In 
the early settlements of the 1882-1900 period  the colonists were not supported 
by any Power and the Ottoman authorities were rather hostile towards them, 
therefore the only way for them to acquire land was by purchase (as did, after 
all, the early English settlers in North America in the XVII century).  
The Zionists´ goal was to install huge Jewish masses in the country, i.e. to 
establish a “pure settlement colony” (Shafir, 1996: 86), a colonial pattern 
wherein the natives are excluded from the settlers’ society and the labour 
market (Australia or the United States can be taken as typical representatives of 
this pattern). This pattern, however, had soon to be abandoned, as the early 
agricultural settlements proved economically unviable: on the same land there 
was a sedentary population whose agriculture was expanding, and the settlers’ 
enterprises were simply unable to face competition with the Arabs, as the 
latter’s salaries were quite lower than those of the Jewish immigrant labourers. 
  
Initially funded by Rothschild, the first period’s settlements evolved towards the 
“ethnic plantation colony” pattern (Shafir, 1996: 84), wherein a numerically 
limited settlers’ population owns the land and employs a low-waged native 
workforce. The problem of this kind of settlements was that they would never 
attract huge masses of colons, and that they were not productive enough. After 
several experiments, a solution was found in circumventing the market through 
the creation of exclusively Jewish settlements run by a collective of colons (the 
kibbutz and, less innovatively, the moshav): these would create the conditions 
allowing masses of Jewish workers to immigrate to Palestine and gain access 
to a totally separate labour market which would be protected from the 
competition of Arab workers.  
This state of affairs was legitimized by the ideology of the Jewish “conquest 
of labour” (kibbush ha-‘avodah), that the newly-born current of Labour Zionism 
managed to surround with a mythic halo and sell as the realization of Socialism. 
However, such a pattern of colonization required huge funds that Rothschild 
was no longer willing to provide: since 1909 it was the WZO that supplied them, 
in a sort of national pact where Jewish proletarians took the burden of doing the 
job of colonization whereas bourgeois Zionists provided the funding and the 
diplomatic support. Such were the socio-economical bases of the intensive 
development of Zionist colonization, which after 1917 could take off thanks to 
the support of Britain, which meanwhile had laid its hands on the country.  
Despite the separate development policy, however, the pure settlement 
colony pattern could not fully succeed, as only a part of the settlers were 
engaged in kibbutzim, and Jews remained a minority throughout the Mandate 
period: therefore Arab workforce continued at least partially to be employed by 
Jewish enterprises until 1948. The result was an ethnic plantation colony whose 
aspiration though was to evolve into a pure settlement colony.  
As a consequence, the Zionist leadership policy towards Palestinians 
wavered between ignoring them, thus negating their existence as a people, and 
considering them “natives” that at most could be recognized as subaltern 
partners. Here again Fanon’s words are illuminating: “Le colonialisme n’a pas 
fait que dépersonnaliser le colonisé. Cette dépersonnalisation est ressentie 
également sur le plan collectif au niveau des structures sociales. Le peuple 
  
colonisé se trouve alors réduit à un ensemble d’individus qui ne tirent leur 
fondement que de la présence du colonisateur” (Fanon, 1976: 215). 
The phrase “collective depersonalization” perfectly fits the Zionist policy 
towards Arab Palestinians. The 1917 Balfour Declaration, the document that 
rendered official the British support to the establishment of a Jewish national 
home in Palestine, fully endorsed these premises, for it did not recognize any 
political rights to Palestinian Arabs, guaranteeing only the respect of their civil 
and religious rights. It is worth highlighting that in the Declaration the political 
dispossession of Palestinian Arabs went along with their complete linguistic 
erasure, as they were denied even a mention: Palestinian Arabs, by then 93% 
of the local population, were indeed defined in it as “the non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine” (Balfour, 1928: 19). Several Zionist leaders’ official 
declarations imply such a depersonalization/erasure of Palestinian Arabs: in 
1918 Chaim Weizmann stated that “the present state of affairs would 
necessarily tend towards the creation of an Arab Palestine if there were an Arab 
people in Palestine” (quoted in Said, 1992: 27, my emphasis); Ber Borochov, 
one of the founders of the Labour Zionist current, wrote in 1906 that “Palestine’s 
native inhabitants do not constitute an independent economic and cultural type 
[…][they] are not one nation” (quoted in Goldberg, 1996: 132), and in his wake 
Ben-Gurion considered Palestinians an Arab community, not a nation 
(Goldberg, 1996: 220).  
The Mandate on Palestine that the League of the Nations assigned to Great 
Britain in July 1922 fully espoused the Zionist theoretical framework: it was 
founded on the racist assumption that some national communities were 
somehow “minor” (“an Oriental man was first an Oriental and only second a 
man” – explains Said, 2003: 231), and that therefore needed the tutelage of a 
power before it could be considered mature enough to gain independence: the 
text specified that the purpose of the Mandate administration would be “to 
ensure the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people” and to 
encourage “the intensive instalment of Jews on the country’s land” (quoted in 
Baron, 2002: 26, my translation). In the earliest Mandate years the settlers’ 
community was still far from being numerically relevant, though, therefore the 
political attitude that prevailed in the Zionist leadership (at the epoch 
hegemonized by the so-called “General Zionists” current) was that of 
  
negotiating with the official Palestinian leadership, but recognizing them only a 
subaltern status: indeed, according to a witness, in the 1921 official meeting 
between Weizmann and Jerusalem’s mayor, Musa Qasim al-Husayni, the 
president of the WZO spoke to the latter as “a conqueror handing to beaten 
foes the conditions of peace” (Morris, 2001: 105).  
In the following years, however, there was a considerable demographic 
strengthening of the settlers’ community and the struggle for the hegemony over 
the yishuv ended with the triumph of the Labour Zionists, who were the main 
advocates of Jewish exclusivism and who pursued instead a hard-line policy, 
rejecting direct negotiations with Palestinian Arabs in order not to recognize 
them as a national community. Alongside that policy, Labour Zionists developed 
very close relations with ‘Abdallah, the Amir of Transjordan, in order to 
circumvent the Palestinian leadership and to discuss with him the future of the 
country. The very few (confidential) contacts between Labour Zionists and 
Palestinian notables took the form of sharply asymmetrical power relations, 
consisting mainly in the corruption of politicians and journalists so that the latter 
softened their hard stance towards Zionism. However slightly different, the 
Zionist Right’s (the so-called “Revisionists”) attitude towards Palestinians was 
based on the same premises: its founder and leader Zeev Žabotinskij too 
espoused the civilizing mission. “We must help the uneducated and those who 
are bound by archaic Oriental traditions and spiritual laws. We are going to 
Palestine first of all for our nation’s sake, and secondly to expunge 
systematically any trace of the “Oriental soul” still existing there” (quoted in 
Gresh, 2004: 43, my translation and emphasis).  
But he also acknowledged that in Palestine there existed another nationalist 
movement whose claims were legitimate. He therefore justified the “moral 
superiority” of Zionist claims on the basis of racial theories: Jews were “a 
«superior» race, ready for statehood, while Arabs were not” (Goldberg, 1996: 
181); moreover, the Jews’ return to the Promised Land was a way “to push the 
moral frontiers of Europe to the Euphrates” (Goldberg, 1996: 182): 
consequently it was “a moral movement with justice on its side […] [and] if the 
cause is just, then justice must triumph, without regard for the assent or dissent 
of anyone else” (Goldberg, 1996: 184). His conclusion was that Zionism would 
have to assert its claims with massive colonization and with the force of arms: 
  
accordingly, the motto of Irgun Tzvai Le´umi, the Revisionists´ underground 
militia, was "in blood and fire Judea will arise".  
The process of erasing the signs of the Other passed through a systematic 
process of emptying his/her signs of all meaning. Colonization, especially after 
the endorsement of the “conquest of labour” policy, implied the eviction of the 
Arab tenants living on the lands bought by the settlers, and consequently their 
transformation in hired labourers or their emigration to towns, where they would 
become unskilled low-waged workforce. Palestinian fellahin thus realised ever 
since the very beginning that the Zionist endeavour would lead them to 
dispossession, and they immediately showed deep hostility towards the 
newcomers. In the 1920s the pro-Zionist policy of the British administration and 
the arrival of tens of thousands of new settlers put landless fellahin (about 30% 
of the whole) in serious danger of no longer being able to survive.  
This situation sparked a whole series of peasant uprisings (in 1920, 1921, 
1929, 1933 and most of all in 1936-39) whose political and economic goals 
ended up being totally silenced by the Zionist leadership, that in public tended 
to minimize the scope of the revolts and to ascribe them to religious fanaticism, 
to the action of a handful of agitators or to a presumed innate irrationality of 
Palestinian peasantry. According to Weizmann these uprisings were “the old 
war of the desert against civilization” (quoted in Gresh, 2004: 25, my 
translation), and in Jacob Tsur’s paradigmatic account their motive was 
“intractable hostility” (Tsur, 1977: 54) and a “virulent anti-Zionism” (ibidem), and 
they were not deemed determined by any political or economic causes. In short, 
as in the tritest Orientalist tradition, Arabs were shown as irrational and prey to 
ancestral impulses.  
The culmination of this process of erasing the signs of the Other was the 
1948 Nakba, the expulsion of 800.000 Palestinian Arabs by the Zionist militias 
during the civil war and the First Arab-Israeli War (see Morris, 2004 and Pappé, 
2004: 123-41). In blood and fire, the slogan “a land without a people for a 
people without a land” had become a reality, turning into brute facts the original 
Zionist goal of a pure settlement colony. 
In 1882, the same year in which the first Zionist settlements were 
established in Palestine, Ernest Renan read at the Sorbonne his famous lecture 
Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? To answer this question Renan had analyzed all the 
  
factors that from Herder onwards had been proposed as the foundations of the 
nation – race, language, culture, religion, geography – concluding that none of 
these was by itself either necessary or sufficient. Having discarded idealist and 
racist explanations that defined the nation in terms of essence, Renan 
acknowledged on the contrary that nations were something historical and 
dynamic, that they were the output of the interaction between “la possession en 
commun d'un riche legs de souvenirs” (Renan, 1882: 11) and “le consentement, 
le désir clairement exprimé de continuer la vie commune” (Renan, 1882: 11).  
Jews were not a nation in a cultural, linguistic or geographical sense, but 
the Zionist movement, elaborating the myth of the return of Jews from the Exile 
to the Promised Land, and turning it into a potential reality through colonization 
and British support, gave Eastern Europe’s Jewish masses an idea able to 
mobilize them; the Diaspora vicissitudes and the biblical events were thus 
presented as the shared memory of a common past, turning them into the 
narration of a nation (a mighty example of this is the famous episode of the 
Exodus 1947, wherein such a myth was inscribed even in the name of the ship, 
that presented as an Exodus the flight from Europe of 4500 Jewish refugees). 
Anti-Jewish persecutions in Europe and the Shoah extorted to many Jews, who 
otherwise would have never considered emigrating to Palestine, the 
“consentement” to become Zionists, and the long war of 1947-49 provided a 
shared memory more heartfelt, supplying the newly-born nation “le capital social 
sur lequel on assied une idée nationale”: “un passé héroïque, des grands 
hommes, de la gloire”. Palestine, in the Zionist mythology now sanctioned by 
the State’s ideological apparatuses, was a desert that Jews had made blossom 
and brought back to History, in perfect accordance to a classical colonialist 
tradition: as Fanon remarks, “Le colon fait l’histoire. Sa vie est une épopée, une 
odyssée. Il est le commencement absolu: «Cette terre, c’est nous qui l’avons 
faite»” (Fanon, 1976: 17). The founding myths of the State of Israel fit pretty well 
the definition of myth elaborated by Roland Barthes: “Le mythe est une parole 
dépolitisée […], [il] ne nie pas les choses simplement, il les purifie, les 
innocente, les fonde en nature et en éternité […] en passant de l’histoire à la 
nature, le mythe fait une économie: il abolit la complexité des actes humains, 
leur donne la simplicité des essences, il supprime toute dialectique […] il 
  
organise un monde sans contradictions parce que sans profondeur” (Barthes, 
1970: 217).   
All narrations are necessarily based on ellipsis, and the narration of a nation 
makes no exception: as cleverly stated by Renan, “l'oubli [...] et même l'erreur 
historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la création d'une nation” (Renan, 1882: 
4): Palestine became a palimpsest on which the previous narration had had to 
be erased so that the myth of the return of the Jews to the Promised Land could 
be written. On the other side of the coin (to quote Uri Avery’s personal account), 
the expulsion of 800,000 Palestinian Arabs was even denied having ever taken 
place: their flight was attributed either to elusive orders from Arab leaders or to 
the population’s “spontaneous” will; the numerous massacres committed by 
Zionist armed groups were not to be talked about – the Deir Yassin massacre 
being the sole exception, as it had been perpetrated by Revisionist militiamen 
and it could be used by Labour Zionists to discredit them.  
Part and parcel of this process of erasing the signs (and the bodies) of the 
Other was the razing of about 370 Arab villages and of some towns’ entire 
neighbourhoods, so that on their ruins the settlements destined to lodge new 
Jewish immigrants could be built up. The destruction of villages went along with 
a renaming of all Israeli-controlled Palestine’s toponyms: under Ben-Gurion’s 
direct supervision, the country’s place names were “Judaized” either by 
resorting to ancient biblical names or by “Hebraizing” Arab names. This process 
of erasing took place also in the legal system, especially in the Law of Return 
(1950) and the Law on Nationality (1952), two of the main juridical pillars of the 
State of Israel: the Law of Return granted citizenship to all Jews (and their 
consorts) who “returned” to Israel; it is worth recalling that at the same time the 
State prevented the return home to 800.000 Palestinians it had expelled. The 
Law on Nationality, which established the procedure to gain citizenship, defined 
the Palestinians still living within the country’s borders a negativo, as “those 
who are not included among the beneficiaries of the Law of Return”. In order to 
expropriate “legally” the land owned by Palestinians, a complex juridical system 
was set up, wherein stood out the Law on Absentees’ Property (1950): this law 
stated that whoever had not registered in the course of the October-November 
1948 census (i.e. almost all the refugees) was to be considered legally an 
  
“absentee”, whose land could be confiscated and rented or sold to Jewish 
settlers.  
If an “absentee” happened to return, he/she was to be considered a 
“clandestine”, and as such he/she was liable of immediate expulsion from the 
country. There were though some refugees who were still within Israel’s 
frontiers: to prevent their return home a special oxymoronic definition was 
coined: they were labelled “present absentees”, thus allowing the army to 
prevent by force their return home and judicial authorities to confiscate their 
lands (Kimmerling-Migdal, 2003: 172-3). They were put under military rule until 
1966, and their freedom of movement was strictly limited: they were confined in 
reserved areas, in practice becoming “invisible”. Even today, although they 
number more than a million, the Arab citizens of Israel are not recognized as a 
national minority. In short, Palestinians became the disturbing element whose 
foreclosing allowed the Jewish State to present itself as legitimate, innocent and 
pure, the result of the long struggle of a national liberation movement that – 
after the extermination of 6 million Jews in Europe – had all the moral reasons 
on its side. 
In his re-reading/actualization of Renan’s essay through the prism of 
psychoanalysis and deconstructionism, Homi Bhabha (1990a) has shown how 
those who have been marginalized or foreclosed by the narration of the nation 
can reappear to disrupt its apparent solidity, creeping into the interstices which 
inevitably open on its surface: “The ‘people’ come to be constructed within a 
range of discourses as a double narrative movement. The people are the 
historical ‘objects’ of a nationalist pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority 
that is based on the pre-given or constituted historical origin or event; the 
people are also the ‘subjects’ of a process of signification […]. The scraps, 
patches and rags of daily life must be repeatedly turned into the signs of a 
national culture, while the very act of the narrative performance interpellates a 
growing circle of national subjects. In the production of the nation as narration 
there is a split between the continuist, accumulative temporality of the 
pedagogical, and the repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative. It is 
through this process of splitting that the conceptual ambivalence of modern 
society becomes the site of writing the nation” (Bhabha, 1990a: 297, my 
emphasis). 
  
The illusion of having ultimately cancelled Palestinians from history fell 
apart in the mid-1960s, when the emergence of guerrilla organizations and the 
founding of the PLO marked their unexpected reappearance: like Banquo’s 
ghost, they had come back to disturb the sleep of the State that had 
dispossessed them.  
This became even more evident after the 1967 War, when the conquest of 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank put under Israeli control more than a million 
Palestinians: once again the Zionist leadership had to face the old dilemma on 
what kind of colonial pattern to develop. The answer was a mixed one. In order 
to prevent the 1948 refugees from returning home (the dread of an influx of 
hordes of colonized has always been a traditional nightmare of colonizers: 
“cette démographie galopante, ces masses hystériques, ces visages d’où tout 
humanité a fui”, wrote Fanon (1976: 11))2, the Occupied Territories, apart from 
East Jerusalem, were not annexed, but transformed into a protected market to 
draw on low-waged workforce. The juridical regimes were differentiated: Israel 
remained a pure settlement colony; the Occupied Territories became an ethnic 
plantation colony. New colonizers, no longer committed to a collectivist ideology 
but prompted by religious messianism, began to settle down in the newly-
conquered lands.  
Going on ignoring Palestinians was no longer possible: however blatantly 
PM Golda Meir could maintain that Palestinians “did not exist” (quoted in Hirst, 
2003: 392), her statements were disproved in those same years by the attacks 
and hijackings of the fida’iyyun, whose faces masked with balaclava helmets or 
kefiah embodied “the unheimlich terror […] of the Other” (Bhabha, 1990b: 2), 
and opposed the materiality of their bodies to any renewed effort of foreclosing. 
Moreover, that same period saw the State of Israel put into question by its own 
citizens, namely by the Sepharadic Black Panthers, a movement of Israeli 
youngsters from Oriental families that the traditional European and Ashkenazi 
Zionist elite had relegated to the margins of society: in the Israeli narration of 
the nation, the marginals from within and from without the frontier had 
reappeared “to rewrite the history and fiction of the metropolis” (Bhabha, 1990b: 
6).  
This time they could note be foreclosed, and the traditional Zionist policy of 
erasing the Other took the form of moral delegitimation (the rhetoric on “terror”) 
  
and of the effort to eliminate physically the PLO, first in the Gaza Strip, in the 
West Bank and in Jordan in the 1967-70 period, and then in Lebanon in 1982. 
In the mid-1970s, having restored the colonial order in Gaza and in the West 
Bank, for a brief moment Israel could even try again the strategy of coopting a 
subaltern local leadership, but the project failed, and the Likud, in power from 
1977 onwards, used the settlers as an instrument to control the Occupied 
Territories, planning to set up new settlements all around the areas most 
densely inhabited by Palestinians.  
In 1987, when the Intifada began (and while the Israeli army was bogged 
down in Lebanon), the efforts to erase the Palestinians were once again 
frustrated: the young boys whose sole weapons were a sling and a stone, were 
a sign that Israeli soldiers were able to interpret only through the “terrorist” 
stereotype, and the consequence was an incredibly violent repression wherein 
the self-evident asymmetry in the power relations shocked the entire world and 
put seriously into crisis the traditional Zionist discourse: “Once the liminality of 
the nation-space is established, and its ‘difference’ is turned from the boundary 
‘outside’ to its finitude ‘within’, the threat of cultural difference is no longer a 
problem of ‘other’ people. It becomes a question of the otherness of the people-
as-one. The national subject splits […] and provides both a theoretical position 
and a narrative authority for marginal voices or minority discourse” (Bhabha, 
1990a: 301). 
Many soldiers from the reserve refused to serve in the Occupied Territories, 
and gradually the State’s founding myths (and, in part, Zionism itself) ended up 
being put into question: it was in this new climate that emerged the current of 
the “new historians”. Within the ruling class, however, the rethinking of Zionism 
was limited to a revision of strategy in which only Labourites were involved. The 
Right, on the contrary, clung to the refusal of any concession or negotiation, 
since it could think of the Other only as absent or non-human: in 1988 the Likud 
PM Yitzhak Shamir declared that Palestinians had to be “crushed as 
grasshoppers […] [and] smashed against the boulders and walls” (quoted in 
Hirst, 2003: 78), and at the 1991 Madrid and Washington talks he prevented 
any step further towards negotiation.  
The 1992 Labour Party’s victory and the subsequent Oslo “peace process” 
seemed to mark the emergence of a new attitude, apparently based on dialogue 
  
and on the assumption of a point of view closer to the Palestinians’. This new 
attitude, though, was not based on a rethinking of Zionism and of its colonialist 
premises, but simply on a strategic revision. Rabin and Peres, and later Barak 
(and also Netanyahu in his brief interlude) recognized Palestinians as partners 
in negotiations, but only on a subaltern status: their claims and rights were 
subordinated to the military, economic and political needs of Israel. Technically, 
there occurred only a shift from a direct control of the Territories to an indirect 
control (see Kimmerling-Migdal, 2003: 355-97; Pappé, 2004: 243 and following). 
The limits of such an attitude brutally came to light in 2000, when the Camp 
David Summit failed and a second Intifada, much bloodier than the previous 
one, burst out. Since then, the PMs that have succeeded each other, Barak, 
Sharon and Olmert, have turned again to the old strategy of erasing and 
dehumanizing the Other: in 2002 the IDF Chief of Staff General Moshe Ya’alon 
compared Palestinians to a cancer, and added that although “some will say it is 
necessary to amputate organs” at the moment he was just “applying 
chemotherapy” (quoted in Kimmerling, 2006: 165).  
That same year, General Rafael Eitan publicly defined Palestinians 
“cockroaches” (quoted in Hirst, 2003: 71). One year before, the former Israeli 
president Moshe Katsav had been so bold as to declare that “There exists an 
immense distance between us and our enemies […] One has the impression 
that at a few hundred meters there are people who are not from our continent, 
from our world, and one may even think that they come from another galaxy” 
(quoted in Gresh, 2004: 43, my translation). 
Once again, Palestinians either are not human or they do not exist: “there is 
no one to talk to”, has been the catchphrase for the last years, and the several 
“peace initiatives” which have been proposed have all been based on an 
asymmetrical definition of reciprocal relations which was even sharper than in 
the Oslo process. This policy of erasing the Other has meant also a repression 
more and more ruthless, whose climax was reached in the bloody military 
operations “Defensive Shield” (2003) and “Summer Rain” (2006). All along, the 
Israeli governments have gone on with a policy of intensive colonization of the 
Occupied Territories, and have added to that the construction of a wall that will 
enclose the Palestinian population in tiny Bantustans planned to stop any 
aspiration to self-determination and to neutralize the “demographic threat” 
  
posed by their high birth-rate. But even these extreme forms of erasing cannot 
but surrender before the materiality of the Other; an effective solution of the 
conflict will be possible only by rethinking the premises of Zionism, thus making 
possible to think of the Other not in terms of absence but in the terms of his/her 
irreducible material presence.  
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